San Jose State University
From the SelectedWorks of Dan Brook

2014

A Physics of Judicial Politics
Dan Brook, San Jose State University

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/dan_brook/38/

A Physics of Judicial Politics
Dan Brook
Introduction
The field of judicial politics or public law — even the nomenclature suggests flux — has
been, and continues to be, in constant motion, as are the actors within it. This subfield
of political science has become more diverse, sophisticated, broad, comparative, and
interdisciplinary from its days as the study of constitutional law and the United States
Supreme Court. The field, fortunately for it and us, has moved “downward” and
“outward” (Shapiro). Partially, as both cause and effect, the study of judicial recruitment
for both state and federal courts has contributed to this positive phenomenon.
Additionally, as part of the field’s breadth, depth, and sophistication, the study of interest
groups and litigation helps to explain the who, what, when, how, and why of the
movement and mobilization of interest groups towards the courts. These related
phenomena will be examined in turn. Taken together, they represent a physics of
judicial politics as they each exhibit movement within their own, albeit overlapping,
spheres of action.
The Evolution and Trajectory of Judicial Politics
The field of judicial politics has evolved towards a growth of diversity, indeed
multiversity, in its scholarship. It has evidenced a renewed interest in the outputs of the
judicial process and the normative questions that necessarily surround them, and has
begun to build new bridges across the social science disciplines (Baum). Although
never completely homogenous, the field of judicial politics once had a core —
constitutional law and the Supreme Court, then later judicial behavior — to which most
scholars congregated. The loss of a singular core, however, is not a sign of weakness in
the field; on the contrary, it is evidence of growth and maturity. Indeed, one might argue
that in this new and improved field, there now exists a set of regional sub-cores in the
various areas of judicial politics. This movement of intellectual dispersal is quite
important, indeed necessary, for the field’s survival. As Lawrence Baum states, “The
field has taken with a vengeance C. Herman Pritchett’s advice to `Let a hundred flowers
bloom’” (Pritchett cited in Baum).
Two of the important movements “downward” involve scholars who began to study
“local courts and judges” and others who rediscovered “the ‘public’ in public law”
(Shapiro). Martin Shapiro states that “Public law governs the internal processes of
government bodies and their relations to one another and to the citizens. It embodies
the public interest and is an instrument of public policies….The political scientist has no
interest in private law” (ibid.). As for “local courts and judges”, urbanists in political
science realized that they also needed to study the “urban courts” to complement their
knowledge bases and to be able to find out “what was really going on in the cities”

(ibid.). For Baum, this was “by far the most important move toward diversity in the field
of judicial politics” (Baum).
Although “The lines between process and outputs and between empirical and normative
are difficult to draw”, it nevertheless appears, according to Baum, that the renewed
emphases on both outputs and normative concerns are not only surviving, but are
actually thriving (Baum). Included here, for example, are studies “on decision-making
and the effects of decisions” and studies analyzing how “legal language directs and
constrains judges in their choices” (ibid.). This, too, demonstrates vitality in the field.
Judicial politics is again forging links with other academic disciplines, yet the jury is still
out on the verdict of its success. The interdisciplinary movement of judicial politics has
been slow and clumsy. “In some respects the study of judicial politics within political
science now appears to be just one loose category in social science research on law
and the courts” (Baum). The primary problem that keeps judicial politics disconnected
from other fields in the social sciences is that “A large share of political science research
in judicial politics continues to fall into areas that are of limited interest to other
disciplines”, most notably history, sociology, and anthropology (Baum).1
Forging interdisciplinary links represents, by and large, “outward” methodological
movements; however, there are also strides being taken in conceptual “outward”
directions which help to contribute to a more comprehensive and holistic field, as well.
One giant step in this direction is the recent return of interest in international law. Some
public law political scientists are beginning to expand their horizons by studying such
critical international phenomena as transnational corporations, trade policy, human
rights, environmental regulation, treaties, etc. Hopefully, these phenomena will be
adequately analyzed so that they may be tied, conceptually and theoretically, to
sanctions, wars and war crimes, exploitation and neo-imperialism, conservation and
sustainability, and other such crucial global political economic issues. Fortunately,
judicial politics is also recently employing the comparative method (despite the efforts in
this direction of Murphy and Tannenhaus over four decades ago), though unfortunately
much of the comparative analysis is focused on constitutional law and constitutional
courts.2
An additional move “outward”, though this one mostly within the United States, is the
focus on administrative and regulatory law. Shapiro claims that the “political scientists
who were concerned not only with the implementation but with the making of policy now
discovered that the old policy-making iron triangle of interest group-congressional
committee-executive agency had become a rectangle with courts…at the fourth corner”
(Shapiro). Still other “outward” movements in judicial politics have been spun off by the
power of the rational choice approach and the critical legal studies and feminist legal
studies movements, which are inherently interdisciplinary.
All of the above mentioned “downward” and “outward” shifts in judicial politics may have
weakened the old core(s), but they also have significantly strengthened and energized

the field in various methodological, conceptual, and theoretical ways. The field is now
more dynamic, comprehensive, and holistic with the incorporation of these scholarly
movements. In addition, these shifts have resulted in the augmentation of the field’s
store of data and knowledge which presently exists and which is constantly increasing.
These developments have proven quite healthy for a growing field.
The Gravitation of Judicial Recruitment
The study of judicial recruitment for both state and federal courts is a good example of
“downward” movement in judicial politics. Although the Supreme Court still figures
prominently in this domain, the other federal courts, as well as the state courts, also
make strong appearances in this area. In fact, Philip Dubois’ award-winning book, From
Ballot to Bench, exclusively examines state judicial recruitment processes. Charles
Sheldon and Nicholas Lovrich, Jr., Henry Glick and Craig Emmert, and John Wold and
John Culver also focus on state courts and judges. Sheldon Goldman, Henry Abraham,
and Elliot Slotnick assess federal judicial selection.
Regardless of recruitment method and level of court, there are three stages through
which a jurist must pass prior to becoming a judge or a justice. They are “initiation,
screening, and affirmation” (Sheldon and Lovrich). Goldman delineates five such
stages3: (1) recommendation to the president, (2) formal presidential nomination, (3)
consideration by the Senate Judiciary Committee, (4) Senate confirmation, and (5) the
symbolic signing and delivering of the commission and the taking of the judicial oath of
office (Goldman). However, these five stages can quite easily be condensed into the
above-mentioned three. For example, Goldman’s last three stages can be fused into
one, corresponding to Sheldon and Lovrich’s final stage of affirmation. Taken together,
the first two stages of each scheme roughly correspond to each other.
In the federal system, judicial recruitment is accomplished through executive
appointment (by the president) subject to legislative confirmation (by the Senate). Some
states follow this model. The vast majority of states, however, employ an election at
some point in the process. The merit, or Missouri, plan, adopted by that state in 1940,
has been adopted by many states and uses a post facto election. The merit plan is one
in which a special commission submits a short list of nominees from which the governor
is required to select one. Thereafter, periodical plebiscites known as retention elections
are held, allowing the voters to decide whether the judge should be retained on the
bench. Slightly more than half of the states use some form of election as their
immediate method of judicial selection. A few of these states have a severely restricted
electorate; they still use the colonial-style legislative election. The remainder of the
states, a plurality, allow popular elections, fairly evenly split between partisan and
nonpartisan ones (Goldman and Sarat).
It is often said that processes effect outcomes, though this is not always so. Dubois
prefaces his book by claiming that some of the judicial selection methods are supported
not for how they perform, but rather for what they are thought to accomplish. “In

particular”, he contends, “most of the arguments mustered against judicial elections
have been anecdotal, if not polemical, substantiated more often by mere assertion than
by empirical evidence….Similarly, the benefits said to accompany the merit plan have
been accepted largely without contradiction, not because of positive demonstrations of
their validity but in the absence of research data to the contrary” (Dubois). Each of the
judicial selection methods have been criticized on grounds of the quality, independence,
and accountability of the judges selected. There is certainly a measure of truth in the
various critiques. All of the attributes we typically desire of the judiciary — quality,
independence, and accountability, generally speaking — not only are at cross purposes
with each other, to some extent, but also can be circumvented either consciously by
politicians or inadvertently by the system itself. The bottom line — or in this case, the
final opinion — is that “no one selection method produces markedly different decisional
results…than another selection method” (Goldman and Sarat).
If it is indeed true, as Goldman and Sarat claim, that the process of judicial selection
does not significantly affect the outcomes, then perhaps we should choose methods of
judicial selection based on other criteria. For example, we might want a system that
most encourages the selection of people from historically underrepresented groups to
join the bench, following the affirmative action policy of the Carter Administration and
supported by Goldman et al. Or, perhaps, we might want to implement the process
which would radiate maximum legitimacy (e.g. nonpartisan elections, the merit plan with
legislative approval, or another new method which combines elements of the others).
Furthermore, affirmative action and legitimacy can be related in some ways. At present,
despite the efforts of Carter, United States judges are a relatively homogenous group.
Indeed, “The backgrounds of judges serving in North Dakota and Texas and New York
are not dissimilar; and the backgrounds of U.S. Supreme Court justices do not differ
greatly from those of federal judges in Florida or state supreme court justices in
Tennessee. By and large, judges in America are white, male, Christian, affluent, and
well educated at prestigious private schools. They differ in political party backgrounds
and in political opinions, but they often share significant political experience prior to
joining the bench” (Gates and Johnson, Murphy and Tannenhaus; Abraham; Glick and
Emmert). The judiciary could become more democratically representative, infusing it
with more legitimacy, and therefore augmenting the strength of the institution, by
selecting more women and minorities — racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, and physical,
though not “mental” as Republican Senator Hruska argued for in 1970 (Murphy and
Tannenhaus; Gates and Johnson) — to serve on the bench. “Should there be
affirmative action for the judiciary?…Yes, we ought to aspire to obtain the `best’ people
for our judiciary — but the ‘best’ bench may be one composed of persons of all races
and both sexes with diverse backgrounds and experiences” (Goldman). This would
surely help make good the promise of democracy.
Conceptually, the study of judicial selection processes and the normative and empirical
questions that they have given rise to represent a “downward” movement from the
judicial apex of the Supreme Court. Yet, this area of study is also strong evidence of an
“upward” movement in terms of the sophistication and maturation of the field of judicial
politics.

The Galactic Interactions of Interest Groups and Litigation
The study of interest groups and litigation is another good example of the “downward”
movement in the field of judicial politics, while interest groups themselves are likewise a
good example of the mobilization and movement of interests from the populace to the
judiciary.
Interest group participation before the Supreme Court has skyrocketed in recent times.
If we use the gauge of percent of cases in which amicus curiae briefs were filed, we can
glimpse a graphic view of this phenomenon.4 In the 1930’s, the percentage is negligible
(1.6%); from the mid-1950’s to the mid-1960’s, it is less than a quarter (23.8%);
throughout the 1970’s, it is up to just over half (53.4%); by 1988, amicus curiae briefs
were filed in four out of every five cases (80.1%) before the Court; by the 2013-2014
term, it was the rare case that did not attract amicus briefs (Epstein). Some of the
reasons which help to explain this upsurge in interest group litigation activity include (1)
the growth in the number of interest groups generally and the number of those that use
litigation specifically, (2) the increasing activity of interest groups in pursuit of their
goals, (3) the increase of money in politics, and (4) the encouragement by the Supreme
Court of interest group litigation and amicus curiae participation (Epstein). As Gregory
Caldeira and John Wright cogently note, the “rising tide of briefs from not-sodisinterested third parties [amici] is … tacit recognition that most matters before the
justices have vast social, political, and economic ramifications — far beyond the
interest[s] of the immediate parties” (Caldeira and Wright).
Some of the organizations that propelled themselves into the legal arena with increasing
energy in the 1970’s and 1980’s were conservative interest groups. Most studies of
interest groups and litigation, however, focused exclusively on liberal ones, especially
the NAACP. Based on this methodologically-limited approach, researchers concluded
“that interest groups resort to litigation when they view themselves as politically
disadvantaged” (Epstein). Susan Olson is not one of those researchers. She critiques
the political disadvantage theory and argues instead “that litigation is a function of some
initial necessary or sufficient conditions [“includ[ing] situational factors, court access
rules, and the group’s opposition”] and the mix of a group’s [perception of its] political
and legal resources relative to those of its opponents” (Olson).
Lee Epstein also maintains that the common “assumption” concerning interest groups
and litigation is not wholly accurate. Epstein finds that “The idea that only politically
disadvantaged groups resort to litigation is actually timebound” (Epstein 1985). She
contends that the belief “that interest groups resort to the courts only when they are
politically disadvantaged does not accurately describe the activities” of the conservative
interest groups that she has investigated (Epstein 1985), although “This assumption
indeed describes accurately the behavior both of liberal groups and of early
conservative interest groups” (Epstein 1985). She instead argues that conservative

interest groups litigate not “because they feel disadvantaged in other political forums”,
but rather due to the fact that “they actually consider themselves to be judicially
disadvantaged” (Epstein).
One avenue to gaining great insight into the nexus of interest groups and litigation is the
role of the amicus curiae brief. As one of the two major legal strategies available to
interest groups,5 the filing of amicus curiae briefs is considered relatively inexpensive
and relatively effective, and is therefore commonly done. It is important to note, though,
that governmental and commercial interests collectively account for practically half
(48.6% in the 1987 term) of all amicus curiae participation in Supreme Court litigation
(Epstein). Nevertheless, conservative interest groups have used this method of
participation in litigation with vigor. Indeed, “conservative interest groups can be
characterized by their nearly exclusive participation as amicus curiae” (O’Connor and
Epstein).
Overall, interest groups appear to be quite successful in their efforts at litigation, though
their effects on decisional outcomes have been challenged. Through the vantage point
of amicus curiae participation, we can perhaps best assess the effects of interest
groups in litigation. Interest groups file amicus curiae briefs for various reasons,
including (1) the desire to have input into a case for which they are unable or unwilling
to sponsor, (2) the response to a request from other groups, and (3) the ability “to take a
broader perspective” in a “well-crafted brief” in order to “influence the outcome of a
Court decision” (Epstein). Many interest groups attempt to plan their litigation, yet
“planned litigation” remains largely an ad hoc affair and is therefore still “problematic” for
most groups (Wasby).
Regardless, the filing of amicus curiae briefs by interest groups, whether as part of a
plan or not, appears to influence at least some of the justices at least some of the time.
“Do amicus curiae briefs influence the Court’s decisions?”, Caldeira and Wright query.
“The extant research indicates”, they continue, “that the answer to this question is,
unequivocally, `yes’ at the stage of certiorari or jurisdiction and `possibly’ at the merits
stage” (Caldeira and Wright). The “yes” is demonstrated by the fact that for most cases
“the addition of just one amicus curiae brief in support of certiorari increases the
likelihood of plenary review by 40%-50%” (Caldeira and Wright). The “possibly” is
suggested by a study conducted by O’Connor and Epstein “report[ing] that one or more
justices directly cited an amicus curiae brief in their written opinions in 18% of all cases
for which briefs were filed on the merits from 1969 to 1981” (Caldeira and Wright). In
sum, interest group activity in the judicial arena does seem to have some effect on
judicial outputs, though to varying degrees.
Although “There is no general theory of courts which provides the key to understanding
differential court usage” (Grossman et al.; as is correctly claimed, the fact that “liberal
groups generally prefer to sponsor cases while conservative groups are more likely to
file amicus curiae briefs” (Epstein) can be a conceptual springboard toward formulating

such a theory. Further research in this area is clearly necessary in order to decipher the
varied movements of the various interest groups vis--vis litigation.
Conclusion
The field of judicial politics itself, along with the judges and interest group litigants within
the judicial system, is in constant motion, “outward”, “downward”, and otherwise.
Generally speaking, these movements have become increasingly numerous, complex,
and sophisticated.
Understanding that the myth of judicial decision making — i.e. that judges merely
interpret the law without making policy and without infusing their own personal values
and ideologies — is indeed a myth and not nearly reality (Murphy and Tannenhaus),
ties together three different yet related phenomena: the movements of the field itself,
the recruitment of judges, and the activities of interest groups within the legal arena.
The study of judicial behavior, viewing judges as human, and therefore political, beings
and not as interpretative automatons, itself goes a long way toward the development of
judicial politics. Moreover, it is precisely because judges are not automatons that
phenomena such as judicial recruitment and interest group litigation take on such
political salience. Judicial politics is as political as presidential politics or congressional
politics, although each moves in sync with its own unique rhythm. In sum, the evolution
of judicial politics, along with the studies of judicial recruitment and interest group
litigation, represents a physics of judicial politics through their separate but intimatelyrelated movements.
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